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Emissions of Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is already affecting 
human survival and development, carbon emission reduction has become an objective 
need to protect the Earth. Most of the domestic researches give suggests about carbon 
tax and other policies after combining our national conditions with international 
experience directly. These researchers often do not consider the game of various 
stakeholders. But the game has effects on the carbon tax rate and punishment of tax 
evasion. They do not consider to impose a reasonable carbon tax aid measures, not 
consider factors in reducing emissions from enterprises itself and not consider the 
credibility of the national pollution control. In this paper, game theory and mechanism 
design is used to research carbon emission reduction, which has important theoretical 
significance and application value. 
In this paper, we do a research on carbon tax，other support measures and 
government credibility in the process of carbon emissions by game model and 
principal - agent contract. Study firstly showed that the carbon tax rate is proportional 
to the cost of central pollution control .Secondly, the contract with (effort, subsidies)   
type for enterprises is stable. The third, lower enterprises’ emissions cost is good to 
reach balance. Fourth, if the government pollution control policies are 
time-inconsistency, it is inefficient. But, under certain conditions, the Government 
will establish "credibility." Finally, we put forward some policy recommendations. 
After analysis of the UK climate policy practice and the situation of China. Such as, 
have a relatively high carbon tax levy, and sign a contract with the company as a 
supplement, and the government should attach importance to establish the credibility 
and so on. 
 This innovation is mainly reflected in the following aspects: (1) Putting the 
carbon tax and punishment into the game model to study is a more realistic carbon 













of the contract in order to complement the carbon tax policy. (3) Using the model of 
KMRW reputation at incomplete information dynamic game model to prove the 
feasibility of the Government to establish credibility. (4) By analyzing climate policy, 
we know that carbon tax and appropriate complementary measures contract is feasible 
in practice and is highly efficient. 
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